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A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: THE
CURRENT STATE OF THE VIDEO PRIVACY
PROTECTION ACT FOR VIDEOS ON THE
INTERNET AND THE NEED FOR UPDATED
LEGISLATION
Schooner Sonntag*
In 2014, online streaming services overtook the traditional method of
viewing television programs.1 Recent court decisions, however, extending
the applicability of the Video Privacy and Protection Act (hereafter VPPA)
to videos provided over the Internet have created unease in the current
system of distributing online content.2 Originally drafted in 1988 and
amended in 2012,3 the VPPA creates a private cause of action for
“consumers” against “video tape service providers” that provide
“personally identifiable information” to third parties.4 Yet, due to unclear
definitions in the VPPA’s drafting, the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits
have reach conflicting conclusions over Act’s reach in the online era and
the reach of the terms “subscriber,” as a subset of “consumer,” and
“personally identifiable information” in Yershov v. Gannett Satellite
Network, Inc., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, and Ellis v.

* Thank you to my editors Professor Mary Dant, Ethan Bond, and Neda Hajian.
1. See Todd Spangler, Streaming Overtakes Live TV Among Consumer Viewing
Preferences:
Study,
VARIETY
(Apr.
22,
2015,
5:21
AM),
http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/streaming-overtakes-live-tv-among-consumer-viewingpreferences-study-1201477318/.
2. The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
3. The Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258
(2013).
4. The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2012).
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Cartoon Network.5 This conflicting precedent threatens the common
practice of online video providers trading viewer information in order to
secure sufficient revenue.
This Note outlines the history of the VPPA and argues that the VPPA
in its current form is inadequate to cover the complexities of online video
distribution. After outlining and comparing the contrasting approaches by
the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, this paper illustrates the underlying
issues of the cases that cannot be properly addressed through the Supreme
Court granting certiorari without causing further needless uncertainty.
Finally, this Note describes the necessary considerations for the legislature
to correctly balance consumer privacy with the economic realities of free
online content and provide a suitable benchmark for online privacy.

5. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 2016); In re
Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 15-1441, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11700 (3d Cir. June
27, 2016); Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015).
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I. INTRODUCTION
We recognize, even if only intuitively, that our data has to be going
somewhere. And indeed it does, feeding an entire system of trackers,
cookies, and algorithms designed to capture and monetize the information
we generate. Most of the time, we never think about this. We browse the
Internet, and the data-collecting infrastructure of the digital world hums
along quietly in the background.
–Judge Julio M. Fuentes6
Every day, Americans use websites and online subscription services
to view movies, television programs, and other videos. 7 There is no doubt
that online access to video content has become the dominant method of
video consumption in the United States.8 In 2014, online streaming
services overtook the traditional method of viewing television programs
with over forty-two percent of American households using video-streaming
services9 and over fifty percent of households streaming movies and
television programs on a monthly basis.10 In addition, people watch other
videos online on free websites such as YouTube, which boasts 300 hours of
new content uploaded each minute, 500 million videos viewed each day,
and over a billion users worldwide.11 Simultaneously, mobile phones now
account for over fifty percent of YouTube views.12
Although this growth allows ideas and information to flow freely, the
reality is that no online content is truly available for free: in exchange for

6. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2016).
7. See Todd Spangler, Streaming Overtakes Live TV among Consumer Viewing
Preferences:
Study,
VARIETY
(Apr.
22,
2015,
5:21
AM),
http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/streaming-overtakes-live-tv-among-consumer-viewingpreferences-study [http://perma.cc/K5XZ-TF3A].
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. 56% of those surveyed stream movies and 53% stream television on a monthly basis.
Id.
11. Statistics,
YOUTUBE,
[http://perma.cc/5369-PVZH].
12. Id.

http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html
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this content, viewers provide data about themselves and their habits.13
Lurking behind the scenes of every webpage is a web of tracking software
taking note of each visitor and compiling the raw data of each visit.14 Most
Internet users know that websites supplying articles or videos to the public
often monetize their content by selling related advertising space to third
parties.15 However, advertisers also seek additional information through
social media to target individuals for services based on their interests.16
The obvious benefit to this practice is that advertisers can observe
consumers’ habits online to create targeted advertising.17 This process
compensates websites both for the information they gather behind the
scenes and for the subsequent advertising opportunities they provide, thus
enabling businesses to distribute online content for free.18 Furthermore,
these advertisements are convenient for consumers, enabling them to
efficiently find goods and services that they will enjoy.19 Subscription
video services similarly track their users’ video habits while outwardly
claiming these actions merely provide personalized services for
customers.20

13. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 266.
14. See id.
15. Contextual advertising is one of the main strategies for monetizing a website, along
with selling advertising space to affiliated sites. See Vishnu, How Do Blogs and Websites Make
Money Online? Monetize Your Blog for Maximum Revenue, COLORLIB. (Oct. 10, 2016),
http://colorlib.com/wp/how-blogs-and-websites-make-money-online
[http://perma.cc/CVW9UA8V].
16. Facebook tells businesses that its advertising tools provide “fine-tuned” marketing to
help its clients find new customers using information provided by its users to target profiles it
deems similar to those of consumers the business already has, along with particular interests and
tendencies that align with the company’s desired market. Choose Your Audience, FACEBOOK
BUSINESS, http://www.facebook.com/business/products/ads/ad-targeting [http://perma.cc/4DYJGW5K].
17. Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION i, v (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-calltransparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/M5X5-7SWR].
18. Id.
19. Id.

Titles

20. See Lara O’Reilly, Netflix Lifted the Lid on How the Algorithm that Recommends You
to Watch Actually Works, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 26, 2016, 8:53 AM),
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In recent years, more sophisticated methods have emerged for
collecting data, enabling “data brokers” to take full advantage of the wealth
of information available from Internet usage.21 These companies create
information profiles on consumers, using data collected from websites,
users themselves, and public sources.22 Data brokers rarely have any direct
contact with consumers but instead sell the information gathered to
corporations or other data brokers.23 Nevertheless, the Federal Trade
Commission expressed concern about the massive amounts of data stored
regarding individuals and their habits.24 As of now, no federal legislation
prohibits brokers from sharing this information with third parties unless the
data is used for specific purposes such as credit, employment, insurance, or
housing.25 Furthermore, consumers do not have a right to know what
information has been gathered about them or to correct any inaccuracies in
the data.26

http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-netflix-recommendation-algorithm-works-2016-2
[http://perma.cc/8448-2F97].
21. According to the FTC report, one such broker has roughly 3000 pieces of data on
every American consumer. Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, supra
note 12, at iv.
22. Id. at iv–v.
23. See id. at iv.
24. According to the FTC report, one such broker has roughly 3000 pieces of data on
every American consumer. Id.
25. Most data brokers are not consumer reporting agencies under the Federal Credit
Reporting Act and are not subject to its restrictions on consumer reports. Data Brokers and
“People Search” Sites, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/data-brokers-and-people-search-sites
[http://perma.cc/H5KD-UMU4].
26. Some data brokers provide general statistics of what sorts of information have been
collected on a specific user but do not provide what exact information has been gathered. Steve
Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, 60 MINUTES (Mar. 9, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-your-personal-information
[http://perma.cc/CMJ9-3CEL]. Naturally, individuals are wary when it comes to the use of
personal information and have expressed concern when such data driven marketing becomes very
specific or seemingly inaccurate. See Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured out a Teen Girl was
Pregnant before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-waspregnant-before-her-father-did [http://perma.cc/PY4D-4F3E].
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However, recent federal appellate court decisions extending the
applicability of the Video Privacy and Protection Act (“VPPA”)27 to videos
provided over the Internet created unease in the current system of
distributing online content.28 Originally drafted in 198829 and amended in
2012,30 the VPPA creates a private cause of action for “consumers” against
“video tape service providers” that provide “personally identifiable
information” to third parties.31 Thus, the VPPA has become the sword for
the recent outburst in class-action litigation against video providers by
consumers concerned for their privacy.32
Yet courts have recently disagreed about how the VPPA should apply
to the modern age of Internet technology.33 In Ellis v. Cartoon Network,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a person who uses a smartphone to
view free content without some form of commitment does not qualify as a
“consumer” under the statute.34 However, the First Circuit reached an
entirely different conclusion in Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Network, Inc.,
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)–(f) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013).
28. See generally Evan Wooten & Zachariah DeMeola, A New Chapter in Video Privacy
Protection
Act’s
History,
LAW360
(June
23,
2014,
10:40
AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/550346/a-new-chapter-in-video-privacy-protection-act-s-history
[http://perma.cc/LAV9-8KP8].
29. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 1 (1988).
30. Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126
Stat. 2414 (2013).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (defining consumer as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of
goods or services from a video tape service provider.” A video tape service provider is “any
person, engaged in the business in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce of rental, sale, or
delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials . . . .” and personally
identifiable information “includes information which identifies a person as having requested or
obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.”).
32. Christin S. McMeley & John D. Seiver, A Look at How Technology is Transforming
the Application of the VPPA to Digital Media, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/look-technology-transforming-n17179921750
[http://perma.cc/8Q6YHHS7].
33. See generally Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir.
2016); In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 262; Ellis v. Cartoon Network,
Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) (illustrating how courts have disagreed about the VPPA’s
application to Internet technology).
34. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1255–58.
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ruling that downloading a free application for viewing of free content is
sufficient to make an individual a “consumer” under the VPPA.35 The
court also held that an Android device identification number and a GPS
location together qualify as “personally identifiable information” under the
VPPA even though the two pieces of information did not independently
provide the identity of the user.36
After the Yershov decision, the Third Circuit in In re Nickelodeon
Consumer Privacy Litigation reached the opposite conclusion, declaring
that only information “that would readily permit an ordinary person to
identify a specific individual’s video-watching behavior” can be considered
personally identifiable information.37 Furthermore, the Third Circuit found
that a child’s username, IP address, gender and birthdate, along with
communications on a website, do not meet the criteria.38 In early 2017, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, thus refusing to resolve the
conflict. 39
Such conflicting precedent does not permit a stable
marketplace, as video providers cannot be certain what information they
can give advertisers without exposure to litigation or even to whom they
owe a duty of privacy.
This Note argues that the VPPA in its current form is inadequate to
cover the complexities of video distribution online and therefore creates
needless ambiguity. Further legislation is necessary to balance consumer
privacy with the economic realities of free online content. Part II of this
Note discusses the history of the Video Privacy Protection Act, its statutory
structure, the terms under debate, and the 2012 amendment pertaining to
online video. Part III outlines the contradictory approaches of the First,
Third, and Eleventh Circuits in applying the VPPA. Part IV discusses the
fundamental differences in these approaches, examines the underlying
35. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 484, 48790.
36. Id. at 486.
37. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 267.
38. Id. at 287 n.163, 287–88.
39. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 266, cert. denied sub nom. C.
A. F. v. Viacom Inc., 137 S. Ct. 624 (2017) (mem.); see also Julie Shepard, Emily Bruemmer &
Andrew Noll, Supreme Court Declines to Weigh in on What Constitutes “Personally Identifiable
Information” Protected by the Video Privacy Protection Act, JENNER & BLOCK 1, 1–2 (2017),
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/16486/original/Supreme%20Court%20Declines%20t
o%20Weigh%20in%20on%20What%20Constitutes%20Personally%20Idetifiable%20Informatio
n%20Protected%20by%20the%20Video%20Privacy%20Act.pdf [http://perma.cc/WN5T-6HC2].
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issues, and outlines the need for legislative action to resolve these issues.
Part V outlines the considerations Congress should take in drafting new
legislation that protects both personal privacy and e-commerce. Part VI
explores the possibility that proper online video legislation can pave the
way for future additional legislation regarding even broader personal
privacy on the Internet.
II. THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
[I]t is the role of the legislature to define, expand, and give meaning
to the concept of privacy. This bill will give specific meaning to the right
of privacy, as it affects individuals in their daily lives.
–Senator Chuck Grassley40
A. Judge Bork & the Birth of the VPPA
The roots of the VPPA lie in the age of the brick-and-mortar videorental store.41 In 1987, the Washington City Paper published an article
containing a list of 146 films rented by then Supreme Court nominee
Robert Bork and his family.42 The paper acquired and published this list
without Bork’s permission and it concluded its article by expressing
interest in the viewing history of other public officials.43 Congress viewed
this publication as a serious breach of personal privacy akin to a real life
version of “Big Brother” monitoring individuals’ activities.44 Congress
quickly took action as both the Senate and the House of Representatives
concurrently drafted legislation to address the impropriety.45 In a joint

40. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 6 (1988).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.; see Christin S. McMeley & John D. Seiver, A Look at How Technology is
Transforming the Application of the VPPA to Digital Media, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/look-technology-transforming-n17179921750
[http://perma.cc/8Q6YHHS7] (discussing politicians such as Senator Bob Dole, Senator Joe Biden, and Senator Ted
Kennedy).
44. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 6.
45. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 284 (3d Cir. 2016).
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session, both bodies passed the VPPA by voice vote.46 President Reagan
signed the VPPA into law on November 5, 1988.47
According to the Senate’s Judiciary Committee Report, the Act’s
stated purpose was “[t]o preserve personal privacy with respect to the
rental, purchase or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual
materials.”48 Representative Al McCandless, the sponsor of the original
House bill, tied the right of privacy in this instance to personal growth and
free speech.49 According to Representative McCandless, the public has the
right to “quiet” and “reflection” in pursuing the “intellectual vitamins that
fuel the growth of thought.”50 To this same end, early drafts of the
legislation also endeavored to place similar limitations on the disclosure of
library records.51 Overall, the Senate Judiciary Committee considered the
VPPA the next logical step in a long line of privacy statutes starting in the
1970s52 and the immediate successor to the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.53
B. The VPPA: Structure and Terms
Paragraph (b)(1) of the VPPA states that “[a] video tape [sic] service
provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable
information concerning any consumer of such provider shall be liable to the
aggrieved person . . . .”54 The Act also specifies several exceptions.55 A
46. William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 23 (2013).
47. Id. at 23 n.37.
48. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 1.
49. Id. at 7.
50. It is not clear if Representative McCandless also believes that cat videos amount to an
“intellectual vitamin,” but here we are. See id.
51. The committee ran into issues of application in the context of enforcement and left the
protection of library records unresolved. See id. at 8.
52. Id. at 2–4.
53. The VPPA is also similar in structure to these two acts, which will be discussed in
section II.B. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (effective Oct. 26, 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012)
(effective Nov. 2, 2002).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).

SCHOONER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

280

5/23/2017 4:14 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

video service provider is not liable when it discloses such information to
the consumer himself,56 discloses such information to any other person
pursuant to the consumer’s informed written consent57 or to a warrant or
court order,58 discloses the name and address of the consumer (but not the
title or subject matter of the video) where the consumer had ample
opportunity to prevent the disclosure,59 or discloses such information in the
provider’s “ordinary course of business.”60 In addition, the statute requires
that video service providers destroy personally identifiable information
within one year unless an action or order is pending. 61 Moreover, the
VPPA prohibits using personally identifiable information as evidence if it
was not obtained in compliance with the Act.62 Finally, the VPPA
expressly preempts directly conflicting state laws.63
Structurally, the VPPA is very similar to both the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 and the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986.64 The VPPA contains damages provisions that are
nearly identical in structure to both Acts.65 Furthermore, the VPPA and the
55. Id. § 2710(b)(2).
56. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(A).
57. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
58. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(C), (b)(2)(F).
59. Subject matter may be disclosed if the sole purpose of the disclosure is for direct
marketing of goods and services. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D), (b)(2)(D)(ii).
60. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(E).
61. Id. § 2710(e).
62. Id. § 2710(d).
63. Id. § 2710(f). Additionally, courts have found that the Act does not preempt local
rules requiring that there be no doors on private viewing booths. Kathryn E. Copeland,
Construction and Application of Federal Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710, 73
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, 2 (2013).
64. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (effective Oct. 26, 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2510
(illustrating the structural similarities in the Acts).
65. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (“(A) actual damages but not less than liquidated
damages in an amount of $2,500; (B) punitive damages; (C) reasonable attorneys’ fees and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred; and (D) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the
court determines to be appropriate.”), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(f) (“(A) actual damages but not less
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Cable Communications Policy Act both center on the terms “personally
identifiable information” and “subscriber.”66 Finally, both the VPPA and
the Cable Communications Policy Act require the timely destruction of
personally identifiable information67 and both expect similarly permitted
disclosures.68 Nonetheless, the VPPA includes damages terms that are
much more favorable to plaintiffs than similar terms in the other two acts,69
thereby providing consumers with more incentive to bring private actions.
The VPPA’s definition of a “video tape service provider”
encompasses a broad range of potential defendants.70 Under the Act,
“video tape service provider” comprises “any person, engaged in the
business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or
delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual
materials . . . .”71 This definition also includes “any person or other entity”
than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1000,
whichever is higher; (B) punitive damages; and (C) reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation
costs reasonably incurred), and 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (“(A) . . . the greater of the sum of actual
damages . . . or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500. (B) . . . the
greater of the sum of actual damages . . . or statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more
than $1000.”).
66. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (pertaining to video tape service providers and
disclosure of a subscriber’s personally identifiable information), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(a), (a)(2)
(pertaining to cable operators and disclosure of a subscriber’s personally identifiable
information).
67. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (pertaining to video tape service providers and timely
destruction of personally identifiable information), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (pertaining to cable
operators and timely destruction of personally identifiable information).
68. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2) (explaining permitted disclosures of personally
identifiable information by video tape service providers), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(c), (d), (h)
(explaining permitted disclosures of personally identifiable information by cable operators).
69. The VPPA minimum damages award is $2,500 as opposed to $1,000 under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and $500 under the Cable Communications Policy Act.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (“(A) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages in an
amount of $2,500 . . .”), with 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2) (“(A) actual damages but not less than
liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1000,
whichever is higher . . .”), and 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (c)(1) (“(A) . . . the greater of the sum of actual
damages . . . or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500. (B) . . . the
greater of the sum of actual damages . . . or statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more
than $1000 . . .”).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4).
71. Id.
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to whom a disclosure is made in a narrowly limited “usual course of
business” or in special circumstances.72 Finally, subsection (c) states that
the aggrieved party has a private cause of action against any person found
“in violation” of the Act.73
The Act defines a “consumer” as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber
of goods or services from a video tape service provider.”74 While the terms
“renter” and “purchaser” are abundantly clear in requiring some sort of
commercial transaction, the term “subscriber” does not specify what kind
of relationship is necessary to establish a subscription.75 Thus, the full
definition of “consumer,” describing the appropriate class of plaintiffs, is a
key subject of debate in courts.76
“Personally identifiable information,” as defined in the VPPA,
“includes information which identifies a person as having requested or
obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service
provider.”77 In the Senate Committee Report, Representative Kastenmeier
notes that subparagraph (a)(3) consciously uses the word “include” to
“establish a minimum, but not exclusive, definition of personally
identifiable information.”78 Indeed, according to the report, the Senate
intended the definition of “personally identifiable information” to
encompass any information that links the customer or patron to particular
materials or services,79 thereby allowing consumers to “maintain control”

72. Id.
73. Id. § 2710(c).
74. Id. § 2710(a)(1).
75. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 487–90 (1st Cir.
2016); see also Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1255–58 (11th Cir. 2015).
76. See generally Yershov, 820 F.3d 482. See also Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1255.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3).
78. The Representative’s opinion appears in the Senate report as the Senate and House
drafted bills concurrently and held a joint meeting to discuss. The meeting determined that the
Senate bill would continue forward. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 12 (1988). See generally Video and
Library Protection Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4947 and S. 2361 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1988).
79. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 12.
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of their personal identities.80 The report also declared the term was
intended to be “transaction-oriented” and limited the scope of “video” in
the bill to restrict the covered transactions to “the sale or rental of
videotapes” and not other business transacted by the provider.81
The damages provision of the VPPA also helps explain the Act’s
recent popularity in class-action litigation.82 A successful plaintiff is
entitled to liquidated damages of $2,500 or actual damages, whichever is
greater.83 Additionally, the plaintiff can receive punitive damages,
reasonable attorney’s fees, and other equitable relief “as the court
determines to be appropriate.”84 Combined with the broad definition of
possible defendants discussed above, this promise of significant damages
under the VPPA is quite attractive to potential class-action litigants.
C. The Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012
In July of 2011, Representative Robert Goodlatte introduced to the
House a proposed amendment to the VPPA to allow video tape service
providers to obtain consent either at the time of a disclosure or “in advance
for a set period of time” and by means of online election.85 Supporters saw
the amendment merely as updating the outdated VPPA86 by allowing
consumers to consent to disclosures of their information while viewing
videos online. 87 But providers of online videos, such as Netflix, wanted to
encourage users to share their movie and television preferences directly to
social media through a simple, one-time click to avoid future litigation. 88
80. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 8.
81. Id. at 12.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c); McMeley & Seiver, supra note 38.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)(A).
84. Id. § 2710(c)(2)(B)–(D).
85. Video Privacy Protection
[http://perma.cc/A5CT-ZRB5].

Act,

EPIC,

http://epic.org/privacy/vppa/#2011

86. 158 CONG. REC. H6851 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2012).
87. Id.; McMeley & Seiver, supra note 38.
88. Netflix helped sponsor the original bill following a call to shareholders in 2011.
Video Privacy Protection Act, supra note 80; Joe Mullin, Congress Tweaks US Video-Privacy
Law so Netflix Can Get on Facebook, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2012, 11:41 AM),
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Indeed, the amendment became widely known as a “Netflix-backed
amendment.”89
Although Representative Goodlatte’s proposed changes passed the
House overwhelmingly by a vote of 303 for and 116 against,90 the Senate
returned the initial draft with further expansion to allow greater consumer
flexibility in sharing their video sharing habits.91 The final amendment
replaced the previous language of subparagraph (B), which had created an
exception for “any person with the informed, written consent of the
consumer given at the time the disclosure is sought.”92 The new language
instead created a blanket license for videotape service providers lasting up
to two years provided there was written consent via any means and the
consumer’s right to withdraw consent at any time.93 President Obama
signed the amendment into law in 2013.94 Interestingly, the 2012
amendment process attempted no other alterations to the VPPA95 despite
lawmakers recognizing that the changes failed to address the digital issues
lurking on the horizon.96

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/12/congress-tweaks-us-video-privacy-law-so-netflix-canget-on-facebook [http://perma.cc/V8KR-FQPJ].
89. Netflix helped sponsor the original bill following a call to shareholders in 2011.
Video Privacy Protection Act, supra note 80; Mullin, supra note 83.
90. 158 CONG. REC. H6851.
91. Id.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013).
93. Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126
Stat. 2414 (2013).
94. McMeley & Seiver, supra note 38.
95. See Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act § 2.
96. 158 CONG. REC. H6851 (“[M]y concerns are not so much about what’s in this bill as
much as they are concerns about what is not in the bill. So I’m agreeing not to allow the perfect
to be the enemy of the good.”).
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III. CURRENT ANALYSIS: FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS &
SPLIT
The statute is not well drafted, even after the error in section (b)(1) is
corrected.
–Judge Richard Posner97
The VPPA lay dormant for nearly eight years after its passage and the
first case under the Act did not occur until 1996.98 Early cases primarily
involved police obtaining video records, including pornography, during
investigations.99 Because there were markedly few VPPA cases during the
age of physical media,100 there were few opportunities for courts to address
the VPPA’s numerous ambiguities. More recently, however, both the
Third and Seventh Circuits have politely noted that the VPPA is far from a
perfect document.101
A. In Re Hulu Privacy Litigation Opens the Floodgates
In 2012, the Northern District in California first applied the VPPA to
providers of videos over the Internet.102 In In re Hulu Privacy Litigation, a
class of plaintiffs contended that Hulu wrongfully shared their personally
identifiable information with various “online ad networks, metrics
97. Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2012).
98. See Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 235, 238 (D.N.J. 1996).
99. Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that officers violated the VPPA when obtaining individuals’ names and addresses without a
subpoena or court order in order to ask they hand over a film deemed to be child pornography);
Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at 240 (holding that an officer’s video records including pornography were
protected and could not be used in a disciplinary action without a warrant, subpoena, or court
order); see Kathryn Elizabeth McCabe, Note, Just You and Me and Netflix Makes Three:
Implications for Allowing “Frictionless Sharing” of Personally Identifiable Information under
the Video Privacy Protection Act, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 413, 428–29 (2013).
100. Evan Wooten & Zachariah DeMeola, A New Chapter in Video Privacy Protection
Act’s History, LAW360 (June 23, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/550346/anew-chapter-in-video-privacy-protection-act-s-history [http://perma.cc/LAV9-8KP8].
101. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 284 (3d Cir. 2016); Sterk,
672 F.3d at 538.
102. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 WL 3282960, at *23–24 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 10, 2012).
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companies (meaning, companies that track data), and social networks,”
including comScore and Facebook.103 In opposition, Hulu filed for
dismissal and claimed that plaintiffs could not have a valid claim under the
VPPA because, among other reasons, Hulu was not a “video service
provider” and plaintiffs were not “consumers” under the Act.104
The district court rejected Hulu’s arguments for dismissal. The court
found that Hulu was a “video service provider,” stating that the VPPA
included Hulu’s streamed videos under other “similar audiovisual
materials.”105 In concluding that the medium of distribution did not limit
the protection of video records, the court cited the 2001 Oxford English
Dictionary, which included online formats in its definition of “material,” as
well as the Senate Judiciary Committee Report’s general attitude regarding
the necessity for privacy. 106
The court was less clear about who a “subscriber” is under the
VPPA.107 The court stated that a “subscriber” need not be a paying
subscriber.108 Although the opinion mentions that Hulu tracked and shared
information regardless of whether the individual was registered or logged
in,109 it does not clarify whether a “subscriber” must be at least a registered
user.110 Instead, the court required only that the plaintiffs be “more than
just visiting” the website to survive the motion.111
In 2014, the same court had the opportunity to set the threshold for
personally identifiable information when Hulu moved for summary

103. Id. at *2.
104. Hulu also argued that its disclosures were under the ordinary course of business but
the court quickly dismissed this argument as Hulu’s activities were not among the explicit
exceptions listed in the VPPA. Id. at *12.
105. Id. at *19.
106. The court listed several of the Senate Report’s statements regarding privacy that are
included in the discussion above. Id. at *17.
107. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2012 WL 3282960, at *22–24.
108. Id. at *24.
109. Id. at *7.
110. Id. at *22–24.
111. Id. at *23–24.
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judgment based on the argument that no such information under the Act
had been disclosed.112 In analyzing the Act’s statutory history, the court
decided that personally identifiable information “identifies a specific
person and ties that person to particular videos that the person watched.”113
Thus, to this court, digital identifiers alone do not qualify as personally
identifiable information, even if they could identify an individual when
combined with other information disclosed to third parties. However, this
standard is not absolute and as the court noted, “context could render it not
anonymous and the equivalent of the identification of a specific person.”114
The court then applied this analysis to the different types of
disclosures Hulu made to comScore and to Facebook. 115 With regards to
comScore, Hulu disclosed an individual’s Hulu ID, the video watched, and
a cookie that comScore used to track users’ interactions with websites in
which comScore was also interested.116 Although theoretically comScore
could link the Hulu ID number to the specific Hulu ID, which includes the
individual’s name used to register for the site,117 the court decided that this
was insufficient to establish “personally identifiable information” under the
VPPA since there was no evidence that anyone did in fact link “a specific,
identified person and his video habits.”118 Further, the court decided that
the tracking cookie implemented by Hulu also was not pernicious as it
merely identified “someone’s consumption relevant to an advertiser’s
desire to target ads to them.”119
However, the court found a triable issue of fact as to whether Hulu’s
disclosures to Facebook violated the VPPA.120 When a viewer loaded a
112. Hulu also argued consent, but the law discussed in this case is prior to the 2012
amendment and so is not relevant. See generally In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB,
2014 WL 1724344 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014).
113. Id. at *28.
114. Id. at *36.
115. Id. at *28.
116. Id. at *28–29.
117. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2014 WL 1724344, at *39.
118. Id. at *40.
119. Id. at *41.
120. Id. at *55.
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video on Facebook, a Facebook “Like” button loaded on the page, which in
turn sent Facebook the name of the video and a cookie through its
programming.121 Overall, the court decided this interaction was markedly
different from the comShare disclosure since the information could directly
link an individual’s Hulu ID and Facebook account.122 As the Facebook
account ID already includes the individual’s real name, the court
determined that the above disclosure was not anonymous. 123 Indeed, the
court declared that Hulu’s disclosure to Facebook would violate the VPPA
should there be clear evidence that the parties “negotiated the exchange of
cookies so that Facebook could track information (including watched
videos) about its users on Hulu’s platform when the Like button loaded, or
if Hulu knew that it was transmitting Facebook ID cookies and video watch
pages.”124 For this reason, the court was reluctant to grant summary
judgment before it had completed a full analysis on the cookie.125
This district court decision, because it supported the need for a court
to look at the specific facts in each case, opened the floodgates for classaction litigation under the VPPA against online video service providers.126
Although the court attempted to distinguish online business from the
personal disclosures the VPPA intended to prevent, it did not resolve
ambiguities regarding the thresholds for “subscriber” and “personally
identifiable information.”127

121. Id. at *44–45.
122. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2014 WL 1724344, at *50.
123. The court likened such a disclosure to throwing away confidential information into a
bin that you knew was searched by the Washington Post. See id.
124. Id. at *55.
125. Id.
126. Wooten & DeMeola, supra note 95 (noting subsequent filings after the initial
decision against ESPN, Cartoon Network, and the Wall Street Journal). In 2014, further VPPA
cases were filed against ESPN, CNN, Dow Jones, and the Walt Disney Company. See generally
Gregory M. Huffman, Note, Video-Streaming Records and the Video Privacy Protection Act:
Broadening the Scope of Personally Identifiable Information to Include Unique Device Identifiers
Disclosed with Video Titles, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 737 (2016).
127. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2012 WL 3282960, at *13–19.
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B. Ellis v. Cartoon Network: The Eleventh Circuit’s Narrow
Approach to “Subscriber”
The Eleventh Circuit endorsed a narrow definition of “subscriber,”
deciding that individuals using a free application (or “app”) on their phone
to watch a video do not qualify for protection under the VPAA.128 In Ellis
v. Cartoon Network, Mark Ellis downloaded the free Cartoon Network app
onto his Android phone to watch videos from the network.129 Using the
app did not require logging in to view content.130 Cartoon Network then
provided the Ellis’s Android ID number and the video title watched to
“Bango,” a service that tracks consumer behavior across multiple platforms
and links that information to a particular person.131
The Eleventh Circuit noted that most dictionaries define “subscriber”
as someone making some sort of payment.132 The court, however,
concluded that payment is only one factor in determining whether someone
is a subscriber, adopting the 1981 Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary definition of “subscriber” as “one that favors, aids, or supports
(as by money contribution, moral influence, [or] personal
membership).”133 In looking at other VPPA cases outside of the Eleventh
Circuit, the court noted the discrepancy in judicial approaches to the
interpretation of the word “subscribers” and elected instead to adopt a
straightforward approach based on the “ordinary meaning” of the word
“grounded” in the text of the Act.134 To accomplish this goal, the court
pointed to the totality of factors involved in subscriptions including
“payment, registration, commitment, delivery, [expressed association,] or
access to restricted content.”135 Finally, the court justified its approach by

128. See generally Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015).
129. Id. at 1254.
130. Id. at 1253–54.
131. Id. at 1254.
132. Id. at 1256.
133. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2278
(Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 3d ed. 1966).
134. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256; see Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 3d 135, 146–47 (D. Mass. 2015).
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emphasizing that Congress had not altered the VPPA definitions of
“consumer” or “subscriber” during the 2012 amendment process.136
Using this approach, the court determined that Ellis’s interaction with
the Cartoon Network app did not qualify him as a “subscriber” under the
VPPA.137 The court noted that Ellis had no “ongoing relationship” with
Cartoon Network and that Ellis was “free to simply delete the app without
consequences.”138 Additionally, Ellis did not have to provide any personal
information to access the content.139 The court in this case agreed with the
2012 analysis of the district court in In re Hulu Privacy Litigation that to be
a subscriber, an individual must do more than visit a website and bookmark
it for future use.140 In the instance before it, the court declared that Ellis did
not establish an ongoing relationship because by accessing a free app for
free content, he was essentially just bookmarking the site.141
C. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network: The First Circuit’s
Broad Interpretation of “Subscriber” & “Personally Identifiable
Information”
In April 2016, the First Circuit significantly broadened the definitions
of “subscriber” and “personally identifiable information” under the
VPPA.142 In Yershov, plaintiffs accessed video and other content through
Gannet’s USA Today mobile app which in turn gave a third party, Adobe,
information about the user including the title of the video, the phone’s GPS
coordinates, and the phone’s unique Android ID.143
135. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256 (alteration in original) (quoting Yershov, 104 F. Supp. 3d at
147).
136. Id. at 1256–57.
137. Id. at 1258.
138. Id. at 1257.
139. Id.
140. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1257.
141. Id. at 1258 (“[T]he free downloading of a mobile app on an Android device to watch
free content, without more, does not a ‘subscriber’ make.”).
142. See generally Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482 (1st
Cir. 2016).
143. Id. at 484–85.
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The court analyzed whether Yershov qualified as a “subscriber” under
the VPPA on the alleged facts.144 Like the court in Ellis, the court in
Yershov consulted various dictionaries regarding the “plain meaning” of the
term “subscriber”145 but ultimately adopted a multi-step approach and
interpreted the term more broadly.146 In this instance, the First Circuit
concluded that a subscriber is simply a person who “subscribes”; thus, it
ignored other variations of the word and instead looked to definitions of the
verb “subscribe.”147 In doing so, the court relied on updated definitions
from The American Heritage Dictionary from 2000, which defined
“subscribe” as “[t]o receive or be allowed to access electronic texts or
services by subscription” and additionally defined “subscription” to include
“[a]n agreement to receive or be given access to electronic texts or
services.”148 In choosing this interpretation of “subscriber,” the First
Circuit overturned the District Court’s decision, one that the Eleventh
Circuit in Ellis had championed in its own approach.149
Furthermore, the court openly deviated from the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach in Ellis in the remainder of its analysis.150 The First Circuit first
analogized the USA Today app to a service of convenience, akin to
receiving a newspaper delivered to one’s doorstep.151 Indeed, the court
found that by simply downloading the app, a user proclaimed intention of
visiting the content more than once, thereby establishing a significant
relationship.152 The court also reviewed the factors relied on in Ellis but
commented that its own analysis balanced these factors “quite differently”:

144. Id. at 487.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 487–89.
147. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487.
148. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1726 (4th ed. 2000).
149. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 488; Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th
Cir. 2015).
150. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489.
151. Id. at 487.
152. See id.
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To use the App, Yershov did indeed have to provide Gannett with
personal information, such as his Android ID and his mobile device’s GPS
location at the time he viewed a video, each linked to his viewing
selections. While he paid no money, access was not free of a commitment
to provide consideration in the form of that information, which was of
value to Gannett. And by installing the App on his phone, thereby
establishing seamless access to an electronic version of USA Today,
Yershov established a relationship with Gannett that is materially different
from what would have been the case had USA Today simply remained one
of millions of sites on the web that Yershov might have accessed through a
web browser.153
The court also distanced its decision from that in Ellis by concluding
that the legislative inaction regarding the meaning of “subscriber” in the
amendment indicated that the legislature intended courts to broadly
interpret the term.154
The First Circuit concluded that sharing a device’s Android ID and
GPS coordinates qualify as sharing “personally identifiable information.”155
Although the court admitted the VPPA’s definitions were “awkward,”156 it
drew inspiration from the Act’s statement that “personally identifiable
information” includes an individual’s name and address, thus stating that
the category of information should be taken to encompass a broader range
of data than just those listed.157 The court considered the hypothetical
scenario where an individual views videos repeatedly from both home and
work.158 In this scenario, the panel concluded that repeated views from
these locations would reveal the identity of the individual in the same
manner as handing over a name or address.159 Therefore, the First Circuit
declared that Gannet should have been aware that Adobe had the “know

153. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 488.
155. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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how” to link the addresses with a particular individual through data
collection.160
As the decision in Yershov merely allowed the case to survive a
motion to dismiss, the court noted that its “actual holding, in the end, need
not be quite as broad as [its] reasoning suggests.”161 However, the First
Circuit’s reasoning has thrown the contentious arena of the VPPA into
further chaos.162
D. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation: The Third
Circuit’s Interpretation of “Personally Identifiable Information”
In June of 2016, yet another federal circuit court, the Third Circuit,
faced the difficult task of addressing the limits of liability under the
VPAA.163 In In re Nickelodeon, plaintiffs claimed that Viacom provided a
third party, Google, with children’s “personally identifiable information”
obtained when both parties installed their cookies on its Nickelodeon
website.164 These cookies then collected, for advertising purposes, each
child’s username, gender, birthdate, IP address, browser settings, unique
device identifier, operating system, screen resolution, browser version, and
web communications, including URL and video requests and cookie
identifiers.165 Among other claims, plaintiffs brought an action under the
VPAA against both Viacom and Google.166
As the complaint listed Google as a defendant, the Third Circuit
initially addressed the issue of third-party liability under the VPAA.167

160. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486.
161. Id. at 489.
162. See Joshua Jessen & Priyanka Rajagopalan, 1st Circ. Video Privacy Decision
Creates
Split
with
11th
Circ.,
LAW360
(May 13, 2016,
12:15
PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/795073/1st-circ-video-privacy-decision-creates-split-with-11thcirc [http://perma.cc/44BD-DCRL].
163. See generally In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262.
164. Id. at 269.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 267.
167. Id. at 279.

SCHOONER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

294

5/23/2017 4:14 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

Here, the court determined that in receiving information from Viacom,
Google’s position was akin to that of the reporter who released Judge
Bork’s video records in 1987.168 Indeed, plaintiffs argued that the reporter
who published Judge Bork’s records would have been subject to liability
under the VPAA if it had existed then.169 However, the Third Circuit noted
that the drafting of the VPPA was unclear regarding the declaration in
subsection (c) that “a person found in violation” of the statute may be held
liable.170 To resolve this ambiguity, the court reviewed decisions by the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits regarding the liability of third parties.171 Based
on these decisions, the court decided that the VPPA merely prohibited the
disclosure of “personally identifiable information” and not the collection of
such information.172 Thus, Google was exempt from the claim.173
Acknowledging that the VPPA was enacted before the widespread
use of the Internet, the court followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s
“instruction” that “[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal
terms ambiguous, [a law] must be construed in light of [its] basic
purpose.”174 Through this approach, the court decided that any reasoning
that would find “any unique identifier” as “personally identifiable
information” was far too broad175 since such reasoning contains no
limitations and would force courts to presume the use of third party cookies
on any website is illegal.176 The court also acknowledged that section
168. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 279–81.
169. Id. at 279.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013); In re Nickelodeon Consumer
Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 280.
171. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 281 (reviewing Daniel v.
Cantrell, 375 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2004) and Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535
(7th Cir. 2012) to determine that the VPPA did not include liability for parties who received
personally identifiable information).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 284 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (interpreting the Copyright Act)).
175. Id. at 290.
176. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 290.
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(a)(3) of the VPPA could be interpreted to widen the scope of personally
identifiable information, but determined that Congress’s intent at the time
of the legislation was that this phrase would apply to other simple types of
information that would identify a specific individual and not stretch to
identifiers online.177
Using the Supreme Court’s words as guidance, the Third Circuit
found that personally identifiable information in the VPPA, as currently
written, could only be information that with “little or no extra effort” would
link individuals with their video records.178 The court bolstered its position
by noting that Congress did not alter the language during the 2012
amendment process to provide an updated definition despite receiving
amicus briefs that raised the issue.179 Furthermore, the court distinguished
Congress’s passing of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act to
allow the Federal Trade Commission to issue regulations expanding the
definition of “personal information” to include “persistent” identifiers that
“over time” could reveal an individual’s identity. 180 Similarly, without a
comparable legislative process, the court was unwilling to expand the
meaning of “personally identifiable information.”181
With regard to Viacom, the Third Circuit focused on Viacom’s
disclosures of IP addresses, browser fingerprints, and device identifiers. 182
The court described these pieces of information as “static digital
identifier[s]” that could not be directly linked to an individual without
further information or considerable data-tracking.183 Indeed, the court
noted that the process necessary to match an IP address to an individual
person would require a subpoena in many cases.184 Thus, the court
remarked that an outcome similar to Yershov would be appropriate only
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013); In re Nickelodeon
Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 286.
178. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 284.
179. Id. at 288–89.
180. Id. at 287.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 281–82.
183. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 283.
184. Id. at 281 n.121.
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where technology enabled receiving parties to enter an IP address in a
search engine and reveal the identity of the individual with no further
complications.185 Therefore, the court found that Viacom’s disclosures to
Google practically identifying individuals was “too hypothetical” to qualify
as “personally identifiable information.”186
IV. IMPACT OF THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT & THE SUPREME COURT’S
INABILITY TO EFFICIENTLY RESOLVE THE ISSUES
[W]e do not think that a law from 1988 can be fairly read to
incorporate such a contemporary understanding of Internet privacy.
–Judge Julio M. Fuentes187
The Third Circuit correctly noted that the current crisis of the VPPA
revolves around the common law’s inability to keep up with rapid changes
in technology.188 While no case explicitly declares a split among the
federal circuit courts, the circuits’ approaches are too irreconcilable to
predict future cases brought under the current VPPA. Furthermore, as this
section will explain, even if the Supreme Court had taken a stance on the
circuit splits, a Supreme Court decision regarding “subscribership” and
“personally identifiable information” would not adequately resolve the
underlying issues at hand. Thus, only Congressional action will be
sufficient to prevent future complications by providing Internet businesses
with a reliable guideline.
A. “Subscriber”: The Battle of the Dictionaries; 2012 Amendment
As currently constructed, the VPPA’s failure to define “subscriber”
leaves courts the opportunity to manipulate the term to their own ends. In
addressing the VPPA’s failure to define “subscribership,” the First Circuit
in Yershov circumnavigated the common definition of the term
“subscriber” and instead looked to define the related words “subscribe” and
“subscription.”189 The First Circuit has faced valid criticism for avoiding
185. Id. at 290 n.177.
186. Id. at 290.
187. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 290 (3d Cir. 2016).
188. Id.
189. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 2016).
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any citation to pre-1988 dictionaries to support its final conclusion
regarding legislative intent.190 On the other hand, the finding in Ellis
requires much more comprehensive contact and sharing of personal
information and uses definitions as understood at the time by utilizing the
1981 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.191 In this regard, the
Ellis approach seems to more accurately represent Congress’s intent.
Yet, as illustrated by the Yershov court’s application of the Ellis
court’s analysis in other respects, basing decisions on a finding of a
“relationship” still leaves ample room for courts to dictate the outcome
based on their own policy preferences.192 Indeed, this split is dangerous for
online video providers as those providers who distribute videos through
apps are currently at the mercy of a court’s choice of dictionary.
Furthermore, under the Yershov decision, a trade of any information is
sufficient to form a relationship between the parties,193 leaving video
providers potentially included under the VPPA should a court deem that the
user intended to form a relationship with the video provider.
The courts in Ellis and Yershov also reached different conclusions
about Congress’s purpose in failing to define the term “subscriber” during
the 2012 amendment process.194 To understand this disagreement, it is
important to note the impetus for the amendment and what it changed. As
noted above, the press described the 2012 amendment to the VPPA as a
“Netflix-Backed Amendment.”195 Indeed, this fact alone explains the
legislature’s priorities in making the changes. Since Netflix users pay for
190. Joshua Jessen & Priyanka Rajagopalan, 1st Circ. Video Privacy Decision Creates
Split
with
11th
Circ.,
LAW360
(May
13,
2016,
12:15
PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/795073/1st-circ-video-privacy-decision-creates-split-with-11thcirc [http://perma.cc/44BD-DCRL].
191. See Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
192. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489.
193. See id.
194. Compare Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256–57 (indicating that Congress did not want the term
to be broadly defined), with Yershov, 820 F.3d at 488 (indicating that Congress did not want the
term to be narrowly defined).
195. See Video Privacy Protection Act, EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/vppa/#2011
[http://perma.cc/A5CT-ZRB5]; Joe Mullin, Congress Tweaks US Video-Privacy Law so Netflix
Can Get on Facebook, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2012, 11:41 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/12/congress-tweaks-us-video-privacy-law-so-netflix-can-get-on-facebook
[http://perma.cc/V8KR-FQPJ].
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access to the company’s video library, they would qualify as “subscribers”
under either a broad or a narrow interpretation of the term. 196 Therefore,
any legislation sought by Netflix would necessarily have no interest in
addressing this definition. Thus, it is clear why the 2012 amendment
process provided no clarification on the scope of “subscriber” under the
VPPA.
B. “Personally Identifiable Information”: Disagreement over a Static
versus Evolving Definition
The differences between the First and Third Circuit’s interpretation of
“personally identifiable information” under the VPAA stem from a
fundamental disagreement over whether the term should remain static with
a 1980s definition or evolve with changing technology. 197 In Yershov, the
First Circuit argued for a broad interpretation, relying on the original
Congressional intent to protect more than just an individual’s name as
“personally identifiable information.”198 Yet the logic in extending what
types of information may be “personally identifiable” creates a possible
slippery slope of liability that places the onus on the private viewer who
may not know a conglomerate has the ability to discern an individual’s
identity from collected data. Conversely, in In re Nickelodeon, the Third
Circuit argued that the 2012 amendment did not update the definition of the
term in accordance with the trend of other legislation.199 Therefore, the
court reasoned that the definition of “personally identifiable information”
should remain static despite the threat of data amalgamation in the
future.200
Indeed, the use of “personally identifiable information” in the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (“CCPA”) supports such a static
interpretation of the term.201 Curiously, the CCPA only negatively defines

196. Choose
the
Plan
That’s
Right
for
You,
http://www.netflix.com/getstarted?locale=en-IN [http://perma.cc/TC7X-Y9EB].

NETFLIX,

197. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 290 (3d Cir. 2016).
198. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486.
199. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 284.
200. Id. at 290.
201. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (effective Oct. 26, 2001).
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the term through an amendment in 1992, stating that the term “does not
include any record of aggregate data which does not identify particular
persons.”202 This revision suggests that the original intention of the CCPA
possibly included impersonal aggregated data. However, even including
the amendment to the CCPA, courts have taken a narrow interpretation of
the original definition of “personally identifiable information.”203 As the
Tenth Circuit observed in a footnote in Scofield v. Telecable of Overland
Park, Inc., the legislative history of the CCPA indicates that the term was
meant to apply only to “specific information about the subscriber” or the
name and address of the individual on a list.204
C. Inability of the U.S. Supreme Court to Adequately Resolve the
Issues
A Supreme Court decision interpreting the breadth of subscribership
under the VPPA could have decisively signaled whether the Act applies
only to the online equivalents of membership to video stores or whether it
applies beyond this scope to an individual’s interaction with any video
distributor online. If the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the
Eleventh Circuit in Ellis and narrowed the definition to the sharing of
personal information and comprehensive contact, it would give video
providers a general idea of what their boundaries are. However, if the
Supreme Court instead broadened the definition of “subscriber,” thereby
broadening subscribership to free, downloadable apps, it would create
considerable economic waste. Companies would err on the side of caution
and incur expense in developing compliant, but perhaps less efficient,
practices. Indeed, such a broad interpretation would not hinder data
collection, but only deter video providers from using the convenient app
format for video distribution. To draw on the newspaper delivery analogy
used in Yershov,205 if a doorstep is too far, the company will not toss a
newspaper but leave it on the public street instead. In either case, the
Supreme Court would need to define precisely the relationship necessary to
establish subscribership, which it is currently unwilling or unable to do.
202. Id. § 551(a)(2).
203. Scofield v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., 973 F.2d 874, 876 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992);
see also United States v. Cox Cable Commc’ns, No. 98CV118/RV, 1998 WL 656574, at *1 n.4
(N.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 1998).
204. Scofield, 973 F.2d at 876 n.2.
205. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d at 487.
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Additionally, if the Supreme Court were to broaden the interpretation
of “subscriber” under the VPPA to cover free app users, it may prove to be
insufficient to cause the desired change in online activity. Indeed, why
should the title of a video on the USA Today app be treated differently
from other content on an app, such as the title of the article, or simply the
fact that an individual has downloaded the app to a device? In the age of
brick-and-mortar video stores, the video’s title or description was the chief
content that would tie an individual to certain interests and entertainment
preferences.206 Today, a video may be only one of many pieces of media
on a page that would provide that same information about an individual.207
Indeed, members of Congress showed a similar thought process in
their desire to include library records in early drafts of the Act—all
information identifying “intellectual vitamins” must be protected
equally.208 Although library records were separated from video records in
the original drafting of the Act due to complications in enforcement against
different providers,209 it should not be difficult to enforce the sharing of
video titles and web page titles through an electronic medium by the same
provider. But, a broad interpretation of subscribership by the Supreme
Court to include such apps would be fruitless without systematic change as
the same data would simply be acquired elsewhere.
With regard to “personally identifiable information,” both the First
Circuit in Yershov and the Third Circuit in In re Nickelodeon addressed the
real concern underlying the debate: data brokers’ ability to unmask the
identities of individuals via their disclosures through accessing web
pages.210 In the end, this fear of “Big Brother” is not about individuals
sharing small pieces of anonymous information in a single transaction but
instead about the possibility of these Internet companies gathering
information from Internet use to target specific individuals.211 For
206. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 13 (1988).
207. Most news stories include both video and text addressing an issue. See, e.g., US
Visa-Free
Residency
for
Cubans
Ends,
BBC
NEWS
(Jan.
13,
2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38605338 [http://perma.cc/WA73-MJDV].
208. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 7–8.
209. Id. at 8.
210. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486; see also In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig.,
827 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2016).
211. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 268.
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individuals to properly combat the possibility of being unmasked online,
they would need extensive knowledge of the processes through which the
information is currently gathered and connected as well as any new
methods through which information will be gathered in the future. Any
Supreme Court decision would only be binding as to the facts of the case
before the court and so would not provide individuals this protection.
Without legislative intervention, courts will continue to struggle in creating
a standard for privacy through the time-consuming process of litigation.
Additionally, any Supreme Court interpretation of the VPPA terms’
application to online schemes would need to consider the motivations of
plaintiffs seeking protection under the VPPA: either a desire to gain access
to the favorable damage provisions of the VPPA, a desire to assert a right
to privacy and a lack of reasonable alternatives, or a combination of the
two. For the Supreme Court to discern which scenario it is facing, it would
need to undertake an exhaustive overview of current privacy law to find
potential alternatives available to plaintiffs. If it were to find sufficient
alternatives, the Supreme Court may side with the logic outlined in In re
Nickelodeon and agree that the Act is meant only to protect a certain subset
of individuals not protected at all by other privacy statutes.212 Accordingly,
the Court would have barred broadened access to VPPA claims for all but
the most basic personally identifying information. But if no such
alternative privacy laws applied, the Supreme Court would be forced to
decide the precise limit of information that is “personally identifiable”
under the VPPA. To set such a limitation, the Supreme Court would need
access to significant resources and extensive knowledge regarding the
information that may provide an individual’s identity. Alternatively,
should the Supreme Court not set strict requirements for “personally
identifiable information,” plaintiffs in subsequent litigation would continue
to attempt to extend the reaches of the VPPA.
Overall, the Supreme Court would not have access to the same time,
experts, and resources as Congressional committees to draft an outcome
that would adequately resolve these issues. As noted in section I above,
forty-two percent of American households currently use video-streaming
services.213 Thus, any drastic changes to the system of video distribution
212. Id. at 281.
213. Todd Spangler, Streaming Overtakes Live TV among Consumer Viewing
Preferences:
Study,
VARIETY
(Apr.
22,
2015,
5:21
AM),
http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/streaming-overtakes-live-tv-among-consumer-viewingpreferences-study [http://perma.cc/K5XZ-TF3A].
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would affect a sizeable portion of the population. Since the practice of
collecting information in exchange for content has become commonplace,
Congress should determine the threshold of information individuals are
willing to trade for video services. Instead of courts broadening the lines of
privacy under the VPPA, deferring to Congress empowers the public to
defend its privacy through representation in the political process. To this
end, the Supreme Court was entirely correct to deny certiorari in In re
Nickelodeon.214
V. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DRAFTING NEW LEGISLATION
TO FURTHER AMEND & SUPPLEMENT THE VPPA
Our decision necessarily leaves some unanswered questions about
what kinds of disclosures violate the Video Privacy Protection Act. Such
uncertainty is ultimately a consequence of our common-law system of
adjudication and the rapid evolution of contemporary technology.
–Judge Julio M. Fuentes215
Congress could leave the VPPA static to govern the limited scope of
the online equivalent of video rental subscription services. To do so,
Congress would first need to amend the VPPA to clearly define such
subscription services and encourage a narrow interpretation of the Act.
This approach would allow Congress to move forward and make key
decisions regarding online privacy as a whole. In fact, doing so is far from
making the Act dead-letter law as the VPPA still governs pure subscription
services that operate online.216 Instead, the current circumstance creates an
opportunity for the legislature to mold the future of online privacy.
In drafting new legislation, Congress should endeavor to provide
sufficient clarity for video service providers of permitted online conduct
while maintaining adequate flexibility to be adapted to future technological
changes. First, Congress would be wise to consider the issues outlined in
the previous section and thoroughly address the motives underlying VPPA
claims. New legislation must be structured so as not to chill the
entrepreneurial spirit of the online marketplace. It must leave markets open
214. C. A. F. v. Viacom Inc., 827 F.3d 262, 262 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
624 (2017) (mem.).
215. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 290 (3d Cir. 2016).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)–(f) (2012) (effective Jan. 10, 2013).
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for small video makers, distributors, and websites to enter and generate
income through advertising revenue. Therefore, video service providers
must be allowed to share some information to gain a profit from
advertisement firms and data brokers. To balance these interests, Congress
should invite commentary from businesses operating in Internet
distribution of online video content.
As the subject matter of this legislation involves highly technical and
specialized information, Congress must ensure that any protections of
personal information are uniformly applied. One means of accomplishing
this goal would be to delineate categories of data and their level of
attachment to individual identity as discussed in In re Nickelodeon.217 Such
categories could establish a firm line on the number of steps or additional
data necessary to unmask an individual to qualify as “personally
identifiable information.” This guidance would prove invaluable in
ensuring uniform application in the future and avoid the current problems
of the VPPA.
Congress should also consider the broad nature of the practice of
online information collecting. For this purpose, future legislation could
also address the source of the problem for the Yershov conundrum218—the
collection of such data that can pinpoint an individual’s viewing habits and
history. As the Third Circuit decided in In re Nickelodeon, the VPPA
merely permits claims against individuals that send data, not third parties
who receive personally identifiable information with the ability or intent to
discover an individual’s identity.219 New legislation could address this
issue by barring such conduct. However, this consideration will run up
against legitimate interests in freedom of speech, i.e. the reporter that
obtained Judge Bork’s information220 and thus any restrictions must be
narrowly tailored if applied. Therefore, it would be best to include a strict
consent provision informing precisely what data is being combined. Such a
measure would allow personalized advertising to continue but provide an
avenue for individuals to set its limits.
217. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 289–90; see 18 U.S.C. §
2710(a)(3).
218. See generally Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482.
219. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 267.
220. Andrea Peterson, How Washington’s Last Remaining Video Rental Store Changed
the Course of Privacy Law, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/04/28/how-washingtons-lastremaining-video-rental-store-changed-the-course-of-privacy-law [http://perma.cc/7K9H-JFY2].
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Alternatively, should Congress have issues outlining allencompassing regulation, a new statute could establish or appoint a
governing body. This body could give nonbinding suggestions regarding
the types and nature of permitted practices to aid future interpretation by
generalist judges. Indeed, a governing body could provide much-needed
relief for both individuals and video providers. Instead of waiting for the
courts to set the limits of the legislation, companies that believe they may
have exposure to liability under new legislation have the comfort of
consulting the body to clarify their concerns and address any potential
issues. Furthermore, the body would benefit individuals by providing a
watchdog for online privacy instead of individuals having to rely solely on
litigation. Should Congress require a more direct approach, it could enable
a governing body to directly control application to emerging technologies
similar to that granted to the Federal Trade Commission under the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.221
VI. CONCLUSION
To some extent, of course, this exercise involves an attempt to place a
square peg (modern electronic technology) into a round hole (a statute
written in 1988 aimed principally at videotape rental services).
–Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV222
Since the VPPA’s enactment in 1988,223 the Act has protected
individuals who wanted to watch videos without giving away their personal
information to third parties.224 However, the disagreements between the
First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits regarding the definitions of “subscriber”
and “personally identifiable information” clearly illustrate a struggle to
adapt the Act to current technology and usage during the Internet era. As
this Note has shown, it is not enough for courts to merely adopt a broad or
narrow interpretation of the VPPA as these approaches will lead to either
inconsistency in application by courts and the potential for nearly limitless
liability for video service providers or under-protection of individuals’

221. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 267.
222. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 135, 140 (D. Mass.
2015).
223. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5 (1988).
224. Id. at 8.
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identities. Furthermore, the current ambiguity regarding the reaches of the
VPPA requires Internet video providers to navigate between the Scylla of
bankruptcy and the Charybdis of unlimited liability.
Indeed, Congress must create new guidelines to prevent the onslaught
of case-by-case litigation that will arise when courts are inevitably asked to
apply such legislation to unanticipated new technology. While the
principles underlying the VPPA protect individuals who engage in online
activities,225 the VPPA itself lacks sufficient clarity. Congress must act to
adequately protect the interests of parties involved on all sides of the
business of online video.
However, with the necessity of legislative change comes the prospect
of fixing the current system. Although Congress created the VPPA using
the form of similar acts in its time,226 it has a chance to set a new standard
for Internet privacy in drafting a new act that both addresses the needs of
the consumer and safeguards the financial needs of the online industry.

225. Id.
226. See 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (effective Oct. 26, 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012)
(effective Nov. 2, 2002).

